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Transnational Activist Networks and South-South Finance: Transparency and 
Environmental Concerns in the Brazilian National Development Bank1 
 
 
Jazmin Sierra and Kathryn Hochstetler 
 
forthcoming, International Studies Quarterly 
 
 
Abstract: This article studies how transnational advocacy networks can influence 
international development finance. Transnational activists shaped the World Bank’s 
lending by increasing its transparency and limiting its socio-environmental impacts. 
Developing countries can now look towards rising-powers’ national development banks 
to finance their infrastructure and energy projects. The national development banks’ weak 
transparency and socio-environmental standards pose a new challenge for transnational 
activism. Can activists leverage strategies used in World Bank reform to influence 
emerging power national development banks? We argue that whether a target is a 
supranational or national institution shapes the deployment and effectiveness of the 
strategies activists can use for influence. A supranational mandate and structure facilitates 
the deployment and effectiveness of a direct strategy focused on the transnational level, 
targeting the bank itself, and an indirect strategy focused on the national contexts of the 
bank’s shareholders and borrowers. In contrast, a national mandate and structure 
encourages activists to deploy influence strategies solely in the context of the lending 
state. They furthermore make indirect strategies more effective than direct ones. We 
illustrate our argument by exploiting variation in the success across campaigns of a 
transnational network created to reform the Brazilian National Development Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Authors’ note: For their comments and suggestions, we are grateful to Peter Evans, 
César Rodríguez Garavito, Al Montero, Marco Vieira, and participants in the 2016 
annual meetings of the International Studies Association and the Latin American Studies 
Association, as well as the editors of International Studies Quarterly and the two 
anonymous reviewers.  
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Transnational activist networks shaped the World Bank’s lending operations in the 1980s 
and 1990s, working with receptive national principals of the bank and allies among the 
institution’s staff. Such networks pushed the bank to routinely and prospectively assess 
the environmental and social impacts of the projects it financed. They spurred the 
creation of an Environment Department and vice presidency. Activists also forced the 
Bank to be more transparent about its operations and opened the operations to direct 
scrutiny by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through the Inspection Panel 
mechanism (Buntaine 2015; Fox, and Brown 1998; Park 2005a; Wade 1997). The 
success of the World Bank campaigns, in turn, allowed transnational activists to pressure 
other multilateral development banks and private banks to undergo similar reforms 
(Bissell, and Nanwani 2009; Nelson 2001; Park 2005b; Van Putten 2008; Wright 2012). 
Thus, the World Bank campaigns became iconic examples of the relevance non-state 
actors could achieve in global governance by networking across borders to influence 
states and international organizations (for example, Bramble, and Porter 1992; Keck, and 
Sikkink 1998; Nelson 1996; O’Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams 2000; Rich 1994).  
 In the 21st century, developing countries increasingly look beyond the traditional 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) to finance their development projects.  
Emerging economic powers—such as Brazil and China— are using their national 
development banks (NDBs) to provide billions of dollars for roads, hydroelectric dams, 
and other infrastructure projects in developing countries (Bräutigam 2009; Bräutigam, 
and Gallagher 2014; Gallagher and Irwin 2014; Hochstetler 2014; Qobo, and Matsamai 
2014). The expansion of the lending scope of NDBs, from export support to international 
project finance, has turned these institutions into global players in development finance. 
Most notably, in contrast to MDBs, they have declined to link their lending to policy 
conditions such as structural adjustment and environmental assessment.  
 The kinds of projects the globalized NDBs finance carry heavy social and 
environmental costs. These are the same problems that activists tried to solve with their 
original campaigns against the World Bank. Emerging-powers’ development banks have 
social and environmental clauses that fall short of current international standards as 
embodied in the Equator Principles (Wright 2012). They only require that borrowing 
countries’ national environmental assessment processes be followed. They also lack 
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mechanisms for the banks to intervene when those are inadequate. The NDBs of China 
and Brazil, the biggest international lenders, do not engage in public consultations with 
affected communities.2 In addition, emerging-power NDBs have provided little 
information regarding what projects they finance, as well as under what conditions they 
do so.  
To what extent can transnational activists use the same strategies that proved 
successful in reforming the World Bank and other development finance institutions to 
influence the international lending practices of emerging-power NDBs? In brief, we 
argue that whether a target is national or supranational shapes where NGOs deploy their 
strategies and which strategies can be effective.  
Because the World Bank is a multilateral institution, transnational and domestic 
strategies served as “partial substitutes” (Cao, and Ward 2017, 81) with political 
opportunities available at each level (Sikkink 2005, 149; see also Roger, Hale, and 
Andonova 2017). Transnational activists used a direct strategy focused on the 
transnational level, targeting the World Bank itself. At the same time, they used an 
indirect strategy, by asking the many national governments that were either the bank’s 
ultimate principals or its borrowers to promote their reform agenda (Kardam 1993, 1776; 
Fox, and Brown 1998, 4; Keck, and Sikkink 1998, 147; Park 2010, 55). The 
characteristics of their target also contributed to the effectiveness of both strategies of 
influence: the World Bank’s broad lending mandate and its multilateral governance 
arrangement—its collective principal—allowed activists to find sympathizers within the 
organization that enjoyed autonomy to pressure for reforms. In addition, the existence of 
multiple shareholders and borrowing governments provided numerous sites for activists 
to seek to influence World Bank policy.  
Globalized NDBs provide activists with more limited opportunities for influence, 
because they are national institutions with fewer, and less diverse, principals. An NDB’s 
mission and structure embody the economic statecraft objectives set by its single 
principal, the executive branch. This governance arrangement reduces the likelihood of 
allies within the bank and the effectiveness of the direct strategy. Indirect influence 
strategies, in turn, depend on the availability of an actor with the capacity and willingness 
                                                
2 Only the Indian NDB has a grievance mechanism (Colombini 2015, 77). 
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to leverage its power over the NDB to implement reforms. However, national 
development banks are only formally accountable to national actors, which reduces the 
number of points of leverage available to activists. 
We demonstrate the plausibility of our argument with an in-depth case study of 
the transnational activist network created to monitor and contest large-scale infrastructure 
and natural resource projects carried out both inside and outside Brazil with funding from 
the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES, Brazilian 
National Development Bank). In the past decade, BNDES became the world’s third 
largest national development bank (after China and Germany). Like the World Bank 
advocates beforehand, this network of activists sought both greater transparency and 
improved socioenvironmental oversight from the BNDES. Because Brazil is a 
constitutional democracy with a history of movement activism and inclusive state 
initiatives (Abers 1999; Abers, and Oliveira 2015; Hochstetler, and Keck 2007), this is 
the kind of setting where we should expect few restrictions on activists as they attempt to 
influence bank policy. 
We take advantage of the contrasting outcomes of two campaigns led by the same 
network. Activists were more effective in pursuing their transparency goals than in 
achieving socioenvironmental standards for BNDES-funded projects. This comparison 
allows us to examine the mechanisms that account for variation in campaign success 
while keeping constant alternative explanatory variables at the country and network level. 
We trace the mechanisms linking activist campaigns to BNDES reform by triangulating 
several data sources including interviews with core members of the network, BNDES 
bureaucrats, and other government officials, as well as archival research of BNDES 
documents and lending data.3 We conclude by revisiting the broader implications of our 
argument.  
 
Development Finance Institutions 
 
                                                
3 We provide as much information as possible. Names and locations are undisclosed if requested by 
interviewees. 
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The institutional landscape of development finance was largely constructed in the 
aftermath of World War II through the establishment of two sets of organizations: 
multilateral development banks and national development banks. Both sets can be 
considered developmental because they provide long-term financing that is tied to 
objectives beyond profits, such as positive economic, social, and environmental 
externalities (Bruck 1998, Babb, and Carruthers 2008). The balance between profit and 
collective benefits varies across, and even within, development banks (Luna-Martinez, 
and Vicente 2012).4  
While sharing a developmental mission, MDBs and NDBs have traditionally 
differed along two dimensions: (i) the lending mandate (the lending purpose) and scope 
(the lending recipients) and (ii) their governance arrangements. On the first dimension, 
MDBs share a broad supranational mandate for financing economic development in some 
set of recipient countries. MDBs have interpreted their lending mandate as requiring that 
borrowing countries implement policies perceived by the bank as conducive to their 
development (Babb, and Carruthers 2009). This mandate, in turn, is aligned with a 
multinational lending scope. In contrast, the NDB’s lending mandate is to support the 
development of the home economy. Its lending scope has traditionally been limited to the 
confines of its nation-state. Some lending by NDBs can support the home country’s 
foreign trade by financing the exports of goods produced in the home country.  
The second traditional difference between MDBs and NDBs is in their 
governance structure: multilateral or national. This conditions the number of proximate 
(closest and most directly influential) and ultimate (more distantly related) principals 
(Nielson, and Tierney 2003). The supranational nature of MDBs implies that their 
governance arrangements include a collective proximate principal and multiple ultimate 
principals (Gutner 2005, 17-18; Nielson, and Tierney 2003, 241-42). For the World 
Bank, the proximate principal is the Board of Executive Directors, a collective of nation-
states. Of the current 24 Executive Directors on the board, the five largest bank 
shareholders— France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States— appoint a 
                                                
4 For example, while the World Bank Group’s International Development Association offers concessional 
loans, its International Bank for Reconstruction and Development incorporates profitability concerns in its 
operations. 
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member each, while the remaining member countries are grouped into constituencies. 
Such collective principals are prone to divergent interests and preferences (Hawkins et 
al. 2006). Furthermore, the World Bank has multiple ultimate principals, such as the 
executive and legislative branches of the largest member countries in the Executive 
Board. These ultimate principals can also influence the bank, most often through their 
control over financial contributions (Nielson and Tierney 2003, 242).  
In contrast, the governance arrangements of NDBs are nationally-oriented and so 
the number of proximate and ultimate principals is reduced. The proximate principal of 
an NDB is the Executive Branch of its home country. The Executive Branch typically 
appoints all the members of the Board of Directors that manages the bank as well as 
senior staff. NDBs also have a more limited number of ultimate principals. Under 
democratic regimes, the legislative and judicial branches typically act as ultimate 
principals: the former approves appropriations for the bank and sets rules for its 
operation, and the latter rules on legal questions that may arise regarding the bank’s 
actions.  
In the past decade, however, this distinction between NDBs and MDBs has 
blurred (see Table 1). Some emerging-power NDBs globalized their lending scope by 
supporting state to state lending, foreign investments of domestic firms, and export of 
services, rather than simply goods (Sierra 2015). As globalized NDBs expanded from 
export to project finance, they began financing the construction of roads, hydroelectric 
dams, and other infrastructure projects in developing countries. Because such projects 
carry heavy social and environmental costs, this new type of lending substantially 
increased the impact that national development banks have on the host countries.  
Table 1. Development Finance Institutions 
 Examples Lending Scope 
Lending 
Mandate 
Policy 
Conditions 
Governance 
Structure 
National 
Development 
Banks 
Nacional Financiera (Mexico), 
Development Bank of Turkey, 
Malaysia Development Bank 
National National Yes National 
Globalized 
National 
Development 
Banks 
BNDES, China Development 
Bank, South Africa 
Development Corporation, India 
Exim Bank 
Global Primarily National No National 
Multilateral 
Development 
Banks 
World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank, African 
Development Bank, European 
Global Global Yes Multilateral 
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Investment Bank, Islamic 
Development Bank, Asian 
Development Bank 
 
The globalization of some NDBs’ lending scope draws attention to how they have 
interpreted what it means to provide development finance. In contrast to MDBs, 
emerging-power NDBs do not tie their international lending to policy conditionalities for 
host countries. Instead, they require the use of their national goods and services by the 
recipient country.5 This choice obeys a logic of economic statecraft: it allows rising 
powers to expand their economic clout and international leadership by promoting their 
firms’ international activities. The loans increase economic ties with other countries, and 
allow rising powers to present themselves as viable alternatives to the traditional MDBs 
(Bräutigam 2009; Kaplan 2016; Sierra 2015). This choice is also consistent with 
emerging-power foreign-policy stances. These countries stress national sovereignty in 
their relations with other governments, which implies not tying their development finance 
to particular policies (Kaplan 2016; White 2013). Instead, they portray their international 
development finance as “win-win” for creditors and borrowers (Bräutigam 2009, 1). This 
non-conditional lending increases the globalized NDBs’ attractiveness to potential 
borrowers and has helped them consolidate as global players (Kaplan 2016).  
In sum, international lending has turned emerging-power NDBs into relevant 
players of global development finance. While their lending has consequences beyond the 
home country, their developmental mandates and governance structures continue to be 
grounded in the national sphere. How do differences in governance arrangements and 
lending mandates impact the capacity of transnational advocacy networks to influence 
global NDBs? Can the same strategies that proved successful for World Bank reform be 
used in these cases? We now turn to these questions.  
 
Networking for Influence  
 
                                                
5 BNDES has the strictest national mandate: international lending only supports nationally-controlled firms. 
The China Development Bank and the South African Development Corporation make some loans to 
foreign entities (Bräutigam, and Gallagher 2014; Qobo, and Matsamai 2014).  
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Our argument builds on existing literature that underscores how activists face 
different political opportunity structures depending on the characteristics of their target 
(Kitschelt, 1986; Meyer, and Minkoff 2004; Tarrow, 2011). A political opportunity 
structure can be broadly defined as the stable, exogenous factors that enhance or inhibit 
prospects for mobilization (Kitschelt 1986; Sikkink 2005; Tarrow 2011). Are the targets 
inclusive, indifferent, or repressive towards civil society claims? Are the targets 
amenable to allies that can provide further openings, information, and legitimacy to 
activists? Answers to these questions, in turn, can help understand what strategies of 
influence are more likely to allow for activist success.  
This framework can be extended to transnational activism as a question of upward 
scale shift (Della Porta, and Tarrow 2005; Keck, and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). This 
occurs when contention goes from local to global scales. Upward scale shift multiplies 
the range of actors involved as well as the number and level of coordinated actions (Tilly, 
McAdam, and Tarrow 2001, 331).6 Sikkink (2005) argues that scale shift allows activists 
to take advantage of both domestic and international opportunity structures. Activists can 
strategize whether political action should take place at the national or transnational level 
(see also Cao, and Ward 2017; Roger, Hale and Andonova 2017; Silva 2013). Where one 
is open and the other closed, activists opt for the open level. When both are open, she 
contends, activists exchange resources and information across borders, but focus on their 
national sphere (Sikkink 2005, 154). We contribute to this literature by studying how the 
opportunities afforded to transnational activists by scale shift are conditioned by whether 
they are targeting a supranational or a national institution. In particular, we ask what 
strategies of influence are more likely to succeed for each type of target. 
Our emphasis on the characteristics of the target does not negate the importance 
of the activist networks’ power resources. We recognize that the presence of two types of 
power resources, expert and moral authority, are preconditions for effective influence. 
Activists can use their expert knowledge to identify problems, explain their causes and 
effects, and provide possible solutions (Cross 2013; Haas 1990). They can also leverage 
moral authority by highlighting shared values and principles (Keck, and Sikkink 1998, 2) 
                                                
6 Here we focus on upward scale shift from national to international contention, but it can also entail 
diffusion from local to national contention.  
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through symbols, stories, and events. Simply possessing authority bases is not enough for 
NGO influence, however. NGOs must deploy them strategically, we posit, according to 
the characteristics of the target.  
 
Transnational Activists and The World Bank 
Research on changes in the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s provides two 
lessons regarding how the characteristics of targets shape transnational advocacy 
campaigns.7  
The first lesson is that after upward scale shift, activists used multiple strategies at 
both the national and supranational levels, and across national contexts. Northern and 
Southern advocacy organizations joined with Southern grassroots organizations to 
identify World Bank reform as a common purpose. They then pursued two main 
strategies of influence. In the direct strategy, activists focused on the transnational level, 
targeting the World Bank itself and its proximate principal in the absence of third parties. 
In the indirect strategy, activists focused on multiple national contexts by turning to the 
bank’s ultimate principals and borrowing governments who could further promote their 
causes and objectives.  
Activists pursued that direct strategy by communicating with and lobbying the 
World Bank. NGOs based outside of the United States established offices in Washington 
D.C. to access bank staff (Nelson 1996, 616). Regular meetings were held between bank 
staff, and environmental, anti-poverty and anti-structural adjustment activists (Kardam 
1993, 1780, 1782; Nelson 1996, 611, 614; Wade 1997). These interactions were key in 
generating support for a reform agenda within the bank (Ebrahim, and Herz 2007, 18; 
Long 2001). NGOs also lobbied the bank’s collective proximate principal, the Executive 
Board, by holding meetings with Executive Directors from dominant shareholders 
(O’Brien et al. 2000, 128).  
The World Bank campaigns also leveraged an indirect strategy in multiple 
national contexts. In this strategy, activists took advantage of national opportunities by 
                                                
7 Campaigns are strategically linked activities carried out by a diffuse principled network of individuals and 
organizations who develop salient ties in pursuit of a common objective and against a common target 
(Keck, and Sikkink 1998, 6). 
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acting as ‘first movers’, putting new issues on the local political agenda and prodding 
others to take up the issues of interest to the network (Fox, and Brown 1998; Rich 1994; 
Wade 1997). The most effective way to pursue an indirect strategy is through the target’s 
ultimate principals. NGOs therefore directed their efforts at the most relevant 
shareholders. The influence of American NGOs over the United States Congress and 
Treasury, two key ultimate principals of the World Bank, provided the network with 
strong leverage (Fox, and Brown 1998, 6). They brought Southern NGOs and grassroots 
movements from borrowing countries to US Congressional hearings, which helped sway 
legislators (O’Brien et al. 2000, 127). Aware that support within the United States for 
their causes was not always enough to change World Bank behavior (Wirth 1998, 60), the 
network also targeted ultimate principals in other member countries with significant 
voting power. For example, European and Japanese NGOs lobbied their home 
governments’ finance and foreign aid officials, and legislative branches, over national 
appropriations for the bank (Fox and Brown 1998, 6; Wirth 1998, 60, 63). Activists also 
pursued an indirect strategy via the bank’s borrowers. These provided influence as both 
board members (albeit with limited voting power) and clients (Fox 2003, xiv) given the 
bank’s concern with its reputation among loan-takers (O’Brien et al. 2000, 131, 217). 
Activism deployed at these multiple levels and contexts was mutually-reinforcing 
(Kardam 1993, 1776; Fox and Brown 1998, 4; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 147; Park 2010, 
55). The direct strategy helped to overcome restrictions at the national level, by focusing 
on the transnational level. A reformed World Bank could, in turn, pressure borrowing 
governments, the memorably labeled “boomerang” pattern (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
When faced with the recalcitrance of the World Bank, activists pursued an indirect 
strategy, turning to national contexts where they could influence the bank’s ultimate 
principals and borrowers (Fox, and Brown 1998).  
  The second lesson is that the World Bank’s supranational development mandate 
and governance structure made both strategies more effective. Regarding the direct 
strategy, the bank’s broad developmental mandate (Clegg 2013) and the staff’s sensitivity 
to international norms (Nelson 1996, 610) provided lee-way for external ideas to 
resonate. In turn, a collective proximate principal gave senior staff a great deal of 
autonomy and influence over the institution’s policies (Ayres 1984, 66; O’Brien et al. 
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2000, 117). Bank presidents encouraged contact with NGOs (O’Brien et al. 2000, 119, 
216; Piddington 1992, 215-19; Shihata 1992, 625). Friendly senior staff created informal 
groups to promote a more expansive vision of development within the bureaucracy and 
engage with activists (Kardam 1993, 1779). Some went as far as leaking internal 
documents to NGOs to further their causes (Long 2001, 48). 
 To carry out an indirect strategy, the network took advantage of the bank’s 
multilateral governance structure. Activists simultaneously pressured several of the 
bank’s key shareholders. These shareholders differed in their openness to activist 
demands as well as the content and intensity of their preferences regarding the different 
issue areas that activists cared about (O’Brien et al. 2000, 128). Multiple borrowing 
governments also provided leverage. The network focused on World Bank projects 
located in countries where the strength of local civil society made it easier to pressure the 
borrower (Wirth 1998, 62). Naming and shaming by local grassroots movements 
generated momentum for the demands made upon the bank by advocacy organizations 
based in Washington D.C. (O’Brien et al. 2000, 128, 130). 
 
Transnational Activists and Globalized National Development Banks 
The preceding sections identified the differences between MDBs and globalized NDBs 
and how transnational activists influenced the former. Relying on this framework, we 
develop two expectations about how campaigns can influence globalized NDBs. 
 Our first expectation relates to how the characteristics of targets shape the use of 
influence strategies. In the case of globalized NDBs, we expect that activists will use 
their direct and indirect strategies primarily in the national context of the lending state, 
rather than at the supranational level or across national contexts. On the one hand, there 
are no international institutions that wield clear influence over these banks outside a 
narrow set of financial considerations (Rodrigues 2016). On the other hand, networks are 
more likely to fore-ground activists of the lending state since the national participants 
know, and have more access to, the institutions of their home country. These activists are 
likely to focus on their national sphere (Sikkink 2005, 154), further orienting the network 
in that direction. This implies that the network is less likely to focus its efforts on 
borrowing states.  
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Our second expectation relates the characteristics of targets to the question of 
which influence strategies will be more effective. In brief, we expect indirect strategies to 
be more effective than direct strategies in generating NDB reform.  
Direct influence strategies, which hinge on persuading the target and its proximate 
principal, are less likely to generate NDB reform. All banks— whether MDBs or 
NDBs— are likely to resist reforms that imply power sharing with external actors (Fox, 
and Brown 1998, 10). Yet, the World Bank’s multilateral lending mandate and 
governance arrangement allowed activists to find sympathizers within the organization 
and for these sympathizers to have sufficient autonomy to initiate reforms. In contrast, an 
NDB’s mission and structure reduce this likelihood. National financial institutions 
typically embody national geostrategic motivations more forthrightly than multilateral 
institutions do (for example, Brown, Heyer, and Black 2016; Essex 2013). NDBs and 
their political principals may perceive strong efforts by foreign activists to influence the 
banks as over-stepping the fine line “between activism and non-interference in domestic 
affairs” (Rodrigues 2016, 711; see also Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Furthermore, the 
Executive Branch appoints NDB board members, providing strong incentives for senior 
staff to follow its wishes, reducing the likelihood of allies within the bank (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003).  
Indirect influence strategies can generate NDB reform if there is an available 
actor that has the capacity and willingness to leverage the target. Such intermediaries are 
more difficult to find when influencing a national rather than a supranational 
development bank. The multilateral governance structures of MDBs multiply the avenues 
for leverage, increasing the likelihood of intermediaries. The fact that the ultimate 
principals of emerging-power NDBs are limited to the nation-state itself reduces the 
points of leverage. To effectively pursue the indirect strategy, transnational activist 
networks need to obtain support from ultimate principals in the lending state, such as the 
legislative and judicial branches. This may pose a high barrier in democratic contexts and 
an insurmountable barrier in authoritarian ones. Alternatively, activists could turn to 
pressuring borrowing governments. This strategy, however, is likely to be less effective 
than targeting the principals and the network is less likely to try it because of its focus on 
the NDB’s national context.   
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Globalized National Development Banks: The case of BNDES 
 
We provide a plausibility test of our argument by focusing on a transnational 
activist network that aimed to influence BNDES’ international lending policy in the 
period between 2005 and 2015. This is an excellent setting in which to test our argument 
for several reasons.  
First, the BNDES follows our priors regarding the lending scope, lending 
mandate, and governance arrangements of an emerging-power NDB. The BNDES was 
created in 1952 to support Brazilian development by providing long-term finance. After 
the Workers’ Party (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores) came to office in 2003, the 
BNDES formed part of the PT’s vision for a ‘renewed developmental state’ (Hochstetler, 
and Montero 2013) and international leadership (Hochstetler 2014, 360-361). The 
BNDES thus sharply expanded its financing from export support to international project 
financing. 8 From 2003 through 2015, BNDES’ international project finance totaled 
nearly $14.5 billion. This international project finance is a small portion of total BNDES 
lending and this article does not attempt to argue otherwise. However, because its lending 
is destined to support large-scale infrastructure projects (Table 2), it is highly relevant in 
recipient countries and turns the BNDES into an important player in international 
development finance.  
 
Table 2. BNDES international project lending, 2003-2015 
Project type Number Host countries 
Roads 21 Angola, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras 
Water infrastructure    
(not hydroelectric) 
18 Angola, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mozambique, 
Venezuela 
Hydroelectric plants 9 Angola, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru 
Transmission lines 3 Angola, Uruguay 
                                                
8 “International loans” is a shorthand to refer to internationally-linked disbursements. BNDES international 
project finance supports Brazilian firms and does not leave the country. Capital for the construction of a 
road or the purchase of vehicles by a foreign government is provided to the Brazilian firm (Authors’ 
interview with BNDES International Division bureaucrats, Rio de Janeiro, May 2012).  
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Oil and gas pipelines 6 Argentina, Uruguay 
Airports 3 Angola, Cuba, Mozambique 
Other 16  
 
BNDES international project finance, in turn, fits our expectations regarding the 
mandate of an emerging-power NDB. Lending is designed to benefit Brazil. BNDES 
makes international loans to support the exports of goods and services of nationally-
controlled firms. Loans in Table 2 only covered the cost of construction and engineering 
services by a Brazil firm (see Online Appendix for list of loans).9 Yet, BNDES lending 
also benefited host countries because it lacked policy conditionalities. This allowed host 
governments to follow only national regulations for the projects and avoid pressure for 
governance changes or structural adjustment of their economies. The BNDES funded 
large scale infrastructure projects at a time when the World Bank avoided such projects 
because of their socioenvironmental costs (Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski 2012, 17; 
World Bank Group 2009). It also financed governments unwilling or unable to comply 
with the standards of traditional international funders (Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski 
2012, 8, White 2013, 122).   
Regarding BNDES’ governance arrangement, Brazil’s executive branch is its 
proximate principal. The executive branch sets the political and economic mandate for 
the bank, and appoints its senior bureaucracy and the majority of members of the Board 
of Directors and Fiscal Council. The Office of the Federal Controller, part of the 
executive branch, oversees the BNDES’ accounting process. The other two branches of 
government are the ultimate principals of the bank. The legislative and judicial branches 
exercise oversight over the BNDES through, respectively, any legislation and rulings that 
                                                
9 These firms were: Norberto Odebrecht (50 projects), Andrade Gutierrez (12 projects), Camargo Corrêa 
(7) and Queiroz Galvão (7). An ongoing corruption investigation among Brazil’s major economic actors 
has implicated these firms. The US judicial system confirmed that Odebrecht paid bribes to access more 
than 100 projects in 12 countries (US Department of Justice 2016, 7). Some BNDES-financed projects may 
be among these. Yet, publicly available information thus far provides no indication of BNDES participation 
in these schemes beyond financing the resulting contracts. In October 2016, the BNDES suspended all 
international project finance until it could conduct internal review of the rationale and conditions of each 
project. Three months later, the bank resumed international lending. See also O Globo 2017. 
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affect BNDES’ functioning. Congress also oversees BNDES accounts and the transfers it 
received from the National Treasury, and can request BNDES participation in 
congressional hearings.  
A second reason this is a good setting to explore our argument is because 
BNDES’ international lending generated a process of scale shift, whereby stakeholders 
across the world identified a common target and purpose. Civil society organizations, 
both in Brazil and abroad, agreed that the BNDES’s expansion from export support to 
international project financing was not accompanied by the necessary transparency and 
socioenvironmental awareness. Brazilian organizations believed that the bank’s lending 
brought negative impacts on local communities across Latin America that were like those 
faced by vulnerable populations in Brazil (Rede Brasil 2008, 13). By 2007, all of the 
Brazilian advocacy organizations that counted BNDES oversight among their goals were 
focused on BNDES’ internationalization support (Sierra 2015). NGOs in borrowing 
countries also connected their struggles to those within Brazil. “Brazilian NGOs were 
interested in the effects of dams, we were interested in the effects of roads. At first that 
seemed like a difference to us,” noted a representative from a Peruvian organization, “but 
at the end we realized these were the same things, we have common interests.”10 The 
annual meetings of the World Social Forum, where Brazilian and developing country 
NGOs shared their experiences and information regarding BNDES funding and its 
impact, increased awareness of their joint aims (Rede Brasil 2007, 13-14).11 Lastly, 
NGOs from developed countries also participated in the network. The Ford Foundation 
and the International Budget Partnership, among others, provided funding (Spink 2013, 
11) while other Northern NGOs— International Rivers, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, 
and World Wildlife Fund, among others— provided visibility and legitimacy to this 
emerging network, as well as funding for its advocacy activities.  
In July 2007, 38 Brazilian advocacy and grassroots organizations created 
Plataforma BNDES (BNDES Platform) to coordinate their efforts to monitor the bank 
                                                
10 Authors’ phone interview with Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Humanos representatives, November 
2016. 
11 IBASE. 2009. Banco Divulga Informações Importantes, Mas Insuficientes. Press Release, March 04. 
Accessed July 26, 2016. http://www.plataformabndes.org.br/dvdn/conteudos/informe_marco2009.htm  
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(Spink 2013). Fifty-one foreign NGOs became adherents of Plataforma BNDES, 
attending meetings to discuss the impacts of BNDES-backed projects and signing its 
documents and petitions to the BNDES presidency. Of these, nearly 80% came from 
Latin America. Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru accounted for the country origin of 
half of these organizations. Plataforma BNDES disintegrated in late 2012 due to 
disagreements among its members about the content and the format of its claims.12  It was 
almost immediately recreated as the Fórum de Diálogo BNDES e Sociedade Civil (Forum 
for Dialogue between the BNDES and Civil Society) in 2013. Most organizations from 
Plataforma BNDES participated in the Fórum, which pursued the same issues as its 
predecessor (Cardoso, Borges, and Rodriguez 2015; Moreira 2015).  
A third reason this is a good setting to explore our argument is because it allows 
us to control for alternative explanations. The network sought the adoption of 
transparency and socioenvironmental standards, yet was more successful at pursuing the 
former than the latter. By examining within-network variation in campaign success, we 
can exclude other plausible accounts, including regime type (Fox, and Brown 1998; 
Smith, and Wiest 2005, 637), government ideology (Florini 1999, 214; Smythe 2000, 86) 
or leaders’ reputational concerns (Burgerman 2001): both campaigns took place under the 
government of the PT, a left-wing party with historic ties to civil society. Furthermore, 
both campaigns were initiated during the same period and were similar in their relevance 
for activists and the resistance they generated from the BNDES. While our case selection 
cannot address the possibility that variation in success followed differences in power 
resources across campaigns, we tackle this issue in our case studies.  
Finally, this case allows us to distinguish the relevance of direct and indirect 
strategies of influence because these were rolled-out sequentially. Brazilian NGOs 
initially preferred to exercise direct influence because their members had ties to the PT 
and did not want to appeal to the political opposition in Congress. Furthermore, the 
BNDES delayed the indirect strategy by pressuring these organizations not to engage 
                                                
12 Some network members proposed that loans should be held to a standard of “co-responsibility”, whereby 
BNDES should be financially and legally responsible for damages generated by supported projects. 
Member organizations disagreed on this point. See: Authors’ interview with Mais Democracia 
representative, Rio de Janeiro, May 2014; Rede Brasil, 2007.  
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with other branches of government, threatening to withdraw from bilateral discussions 
with the NGOs.13 Yet as the activists became more frustrated with the bank, they became 
open to collaboration with its ultimate principals.14  
In the remainder of the article, we first present the variation in the success of the 
two campaigns led by the transnational advocacy network. To show the plausibility of 
our argument, we trace the mechanisms linking the network’s strategies to campaign 
outcomes. If our argument is correct, we should find three kinds of evidence. First, the 
transnational network should deploy its influence strategies primarily within Brazil. 
Second, when the network relies only on a direct strategy of influence, it should face 
insurmountable obstacles to BNDES reform. Finally, when the network is able to 
implement an indirect strategy of influence, it will advance its reform objectives by 
acting as a ‘first mover,’ placing its goals on the public agenda and pressuring ultimate 
principals to take up its cause. 
 
The BNDES Activists: Campaigns, Strategies, and Varying Outcomes 
 
The BNDES activists had varying levels of success in achieving their campaign 
goals. The organizations themselves concluded in 2015 that although the network 
increased the bank’s transparency, it did not make significant advances on the 
socioenvironmental front (Borges 2015a; IBASE 2014, 17-18). 
The BNDES activists rallied around two primary objectives. The first objective 
was to achieve greater transparency about BNDES’s activities. At the time that the 
network was created, the BNDES did not publicize even basic information regarding its 
loans. NGOs did not have any opportunity to interact with BNDES authorities and the 
bank’s communication with the public was limited to press releases (Plataforma BNDES 
2007, 5). Activists demanded that the BNDES disclose its loan portfolio and its economic 
analyses so they could understand the rationale behind each loan. The network believed 
that the BNDES should follow the transparency standards set by the MDBs, which 
                                                
13 Authors’ interview with NGO representative, location undisclosed, May 2014. 
14 Authors’ interview with NGO representative, location undisclosed, May 2014. 
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published loan data and had clear policies regarding its diffusion.15 They also demanded 
that the bank should state its long-term strategy and priorities (Plataforma BNDES 2007, 
5) and establish an institutional mechanism for interactions with civil society. 
A second goal of the network was for the BNDES to impose socioenvironmental 
requirements for the projects it financed (Rede Brasil 2008, 21-22). Domestically, 
BNDES relied on other public agencies to assess socioenvironmental impacts and 
conduct any consultation with affected communities. For international project finance, 
the bank followed the host government’s impact assessment procedures, which were 
often weaker than the Brazilian legislation. Activists proposed that the BNDES should 
incorporate its own socio-environmental criteria in the loan evaluation process. They also 
demanded participatory and conflict resolution mechanisms to increase the influence of 
local populations (Borges 2015a, 40-45).  Overall, the transnational network pushed for 
the bank to raise its domestic standards and to hold international projects to the same 
principles.  
Regarding the transparency objective, the bank launched BNDES Transparency in 
2008. Through this program, the bank agreed to present online data on the top 50 projects 
within each operational area during the past 12 months. This included information on the 
loan recipient, amount of the loan, and its general purpose.16 In 2012, BNDES added 
information about international loans, including the host country, the contracting firm, 
and the purpose of the loan, but not its amount, which was considered proprietary 
information (Conectas 2013, 56). Further information regarding its international loans 
was finally posted in 2015. In 2012, the BNDES also created a Citizen Information 
Service to respond to citizens’ information requests and transformed its communication 
strategy. Top BNDES officials published newspaper editorials providing the rationale 
behind its policies. The bank also became active in social media, using its accounts to 
respond to concerns, and to provide data and rationale for its loans.17 BNDES itself noted 
                                                
15 See Badin 2009a. 
16 See BNDES. “BNDES Transparente.” Accessed June 30, 2016. 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Consulta_as_op
eracoes_do_BNDES/planilhas_operacoes_diretas_e_indiretas_nao_automaticas.html.  
17 Portal Brasil 2010 ; Batista 2015.  
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that it posted the information as the result of a gradual, cumulative process of opening its 
books to society.18 Transparency is not complete: loan data is published only after a 
contract is issued, the bank does not disclose its rationale for supporting a project, and 
information on international loans is more limited than on national loans. Yet, the 
advances of the past decade made the BNDES more accountable (Fórum de Diálogo 
2014a). 
The effects of the network were more limited in BNDES’ social and 
environmental impact assessments and conditions. In December 2008, the BNDES 
changed its regulations and began to demand that loan recipients (public and private) 
present an assessment of the expected socio-environmental impact of their projects when 
presenting a formal loan request. A year later it created an Environmental Division and in 
2010 launched its Socioenvironmental Responsibility Policy, accompanied by ten broad 
guidelines for assessing socioenvironmental impact (Friends of the Earth US 2014, 12).19  
Substantive changes did not follow these reforms (Fórum de Diálogo 2014b). The 
BNDES relied on the company’s assessment of potential socio-environmental impacts, 
rather than carrying out an independent study. Furthermore, the firm’s assessment and 
BNDES’s evaluation of it were not publicly available, impeding local communities from 
participating in impact assessment. BNDES’s loans for international activities still relied 
primarily on the evaluations of host governments. The Socioenvironmental 
Responsibility Policy remained vague (Borges 2015a) and could not be used to hold the 
BNDES accountable to its own standards. After 2011, the BNDES pulled back from 
more active engagement with socioenvironmental issues. A loan it received from the 
World Bank to develop peer-reviewed social and environmental baseline standards in 28 
sectors was not fully executed (McElhinny 2011, 1). 20 By 2016, the BNDES had 
completed guidelines for only three sectors and these were not mandatory (Fórum de 
                                                
18 BNDES. 2016. “#verdadeiro/falso.” Facebook Post. Accessed April 22, 2016.  
https://www.facebook.com/bndes.imprensa/photos/pb.810484929045349.-
2207520000.1453143955./868671796559995/?type=3&theater 
19 BNDES presented a revised version in 2014. 
20 It was only contemplating domestic loans at the time. See: Authors’ telephone interview with Sergio 
Weguelin, then-Superintendent of BNDES Environment Area, July 2011. 
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Diálogo 2014b, 4). 21   
We show below that this observed variation in campaign success is explained by 
the strategies the network could leverage. While the direct strategy met obstacles in both 
campaigns, the network gained the support of the bank’s ultimate principals for its 
transparency campaign. The socioenvironmental campaign found fewer allies to leverage 
for indirect influence, and resulted in limited gains. Both campaigns missed opportunities 
to deploy pressure on recipient governments, delaying and reducing their gains. 
 
 
Transparency Standards Campaign 
The transnational activist network had ample moral and expert authority for its 
transparency campaign. Its expert authority stemmed in part from the knowledge 
accumulated during the World Bank campaigns, when Brazilian organizations forced the 
MDB to publish its Country Assistance Strategy document for the first time (Vianna and 
Cambeses 1999, 16-17). Furthermore, the network built its knowledge on the specificities 
of legislation about BNDES. At stake in the discussion was the legal tension between, on 
the one hand, the BNDES’ obligations as a bank to protect clients’ confidential 
information and, on the other hand, its obligations as a public agency to disclose its use of 
public funds. The network’s early perception was that it would not be able to exercise 
influence if it did not reduce the resource and informational asymmetries between it and 
BNDES.22 Network documents show their increasing ability to discuss the applicability 
of various laws and regulations and to contest the bank’s interpretations (Fórum de 
Diálogo 2014a). This growing expertise was supported by transnational information 
sharing and coordination, including the joint organization of seminars and publication of 
documents by Brazilian and foreign organizations (Conectas 2013, 54; DAR 2014a). 
The network also pitted moral arguments about democracy against the bank’s 
                                                
21 See BNDES. “Guias Socioambientais.” Website. Accessed March 3, 2016.  
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/O_BNDES/Responsabilidade_Social_e
_Ambiental/Politica_Socioambiental/guias_socioambientais.html#  
22 Authors’ interview with Caio Borges, Director of Business and Human Rights Project, Conectas, São 
Paulo, June 2014. 
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claims of technocratic competence. It argued that BNDES distributed public money with 
limited oversight from elected representatives, much less citizens. Democracy, activists 
noted, demanded that affected populations in Brazil and abroad be given the information 
they needed to exercise oversight (Rede Brasil 2008, 13, 19; Badin 2009b, 23-24; Spink 
2013, 16). The network requested the creation of a national equivalent to the PT’s 
subnational participatory budgeting procedures (Abers 1999). By drawing on the historic 
principles and flagship policy innovation of the PT, activists were holding the 
government accountable to its mandate.  
Drawing on these power resources, the network first pursued a direct strategy for 
influence. In 2005, several NGOs sent a formal request to the BNDES to create an 
institutional channel for dialogue between the bank and civil society (Ibase 2014, 4). 
BNDES president Guido Mantega (2004-2006) responded favorably and created an 
internal working group tasked with proposing a BNDES transparency policy in 
consultation with interested NGOs. It informally consulted with different organizations, 
ranging from eight to twenty NGO representatives per meeting. At this point, activist 
demands were quite limited, asking the BNDES to publish data regarding the 10 largest 
projects within the bank’s five main operational areas (Spink 2013, 14). This objective 
was not achieved and NGOs were left disappointed by the complete failure of the 
working group after Mantega left BNDES in March 2006.23   
Activists then began to use an indirect strategy by acting as ‘first movers’. They 
helped place the issue of BNDES transparency on the agenda of the judicial and 
legislative branches and later took advantage of the legislative changes to further their 
agenda. The first episode of the indirect strategy came in the form of an open letter from 
Plataforma BNDES to the Federal Prosecutors Office in April 2007 asking the latter to 
enforce the constitutional principle of transparency in the public sector. The BNDES 
sought to avoid the involvement of federal prosecutors. It asked the NGOs to withdraw 
their request in exchange for the resumption of direct negotiations (Spink 2013, 15; Ibase 
2014, 6-7). Three months later, the BNDES working group and the network organized a 
seminar entitled “The BNDES that we have and the BNDES that we want” (Pontes 
Furtado 2007). This seminar was the first time that the bank participated in a public 
                                                
23 Plataforma BNDES. “Carta ao Presidente do BNDES, Damian Fiocca.” Press Release. 07/13/2006. 
 
22 
meeting with members of Brazil’s civil society (Pontes Furtado 2007, 8). The meeting 
focused on BNDES’ domestic lending. 
Shortly after, the BNDES published data on its top 50 projects within each 
operational area. In 2008, the bank launched the BNDES Transparency portal mentioned 
above (IBASE 2014, 8). Bank president Luciano Coutinho (2007-2016) invited civil 
society representatives to the ceremony where BNDES announced its new policy, saying, 
“Through dialogue with social movements, we built a work agenda that included 
maximal transparency by the bank for public evaluation.”24 Yet activists remained 
unsatisfied and continued to pressure the bank, demanding that it publish its full loan 
portfolio and expand the role of its Ombudsman office (Borges 2015b). 
The transnational network continued to exercise indirect pressure by focusing on 
advancing transparency legislation, joining existing efforts within Brazil. The network 
urged Congress to tie Treasury funding for the BNDES to the bank’s response to civil 
society’s concerns.25 Pressure from NGOs, many of which were network members, was 
fundamental for Congress to approve a Freedom of Information Act in 2012 (Malin 2012, 
4).26 The new law required disclosure of public agencies’ programs, projects, and 
disbursement of financial resources. It compels all government agencies to follow 
standards of transparency and create a Citizen Information Service (through which 
citizens may request additional or specific information). The Act also includes sanctions 
for non-compliance. According to a BNDES official, “the freedom of information 
legislation was a big deal. We took it very seriously and it began to change the 
institutional culture within the bank.”27  
                                                
24 BNDES. 2008. “BNDES Reforça Mecanismos de Combate à Discriminação e Amplia Transparência.” 
February 15. Press Release. Accessed April 14, 2016.  
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/Sala_de_imprensa/Noticias/2008/20080
215_not017_08.html  
25 Plataforma BNDES. 2011. “Carta Contra a Aprovação no Senado da MP 526 Sobre o Aumento em R$ 
55 bilhões do orçamento do BNDES.” Press Release. June 28.  
26 See: Lei 12.527/2011. On the role of NGOs, see Fórum de Direito de Acesso a Informações Públicas. 
“Sobre o Fórum.” Website. Accessed April 21, 2016. http://www.informacaopublica.org.br/?page_id=2 For 
other actors’ contribution, see Michener 2014. 
27 Authors’ interview with Fábio Kerche, advisor to the BNDES presidency, Rio de Janeiro, June 2014. 
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The network was not yet satisfied, however, as the BNDES continued to resist 
further disclosure of its lending portfolio. The bank drew a line against transparency for 
international project finance. It argued that there remained a legal grey area about 
whether the Freedom of Information Act overrode legislation protecting bank secrecy. 
The BNDES’ proximate principal also staunchly defended the bank’s disclosure policy. 
President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) even vetoed a legislative project that prevented 
BNDES from claiming bank secrecy.28  
The network, armed with its new technical expertise on BNDES-related 
legislation, was well prepared to contest these claims (Fórum de Diálogo 2014a). It 
continued to pursue the full implementation of the law by maintaining pressure on both 
the bank and the intermediaries. Activists leveraged a public outreach campaign to show 
how the BNDES failed to comply with the Freedom of Information Act. It sought to 
include this issue in congressional debates on BNDES by publishing questions for 
congressional members to ask when the BNDES president provided testimony.29 This 
practice also allowed foreign members of the network to represent their views to 
Brazilian legislators.30 The network also published explicit recommendations for areas 
where Congress could increase its oversight over the BNDES (Conectas 2013).  
Public prosecutors took judicial actions against the BNDES between 2012 and 
2015 to force the bank to fulfill its duties under the Freedom of Information Act. The 
BNDES appealed unfavorable verdicts from lower courts,31 but the Federal Supreme 
                                                
28 O Globo. Dilma veta fim do sigilo das operações do BNDES. May 22. 
http://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2015/05/dilma-veta-fim-do-sigilo-das-operacoes-do-bndes.html 
Accessed April 29, 2017.  
29 Conectas. 2015. “BNDES Questionado.” Press Release. April 13. Accessed April 15, 2016. 
http://www.conectas.org/pt/noticia/33853-bndes-questionado. Conectas. 2015. “Replica ao Presidente do 
BNDES.” April 17. Accessed on April 15, 2016. http://www.conectas.org/pt/acoes/empresas-e-direitos-
humanos/noticia/34860-replica-ao-presidente-do-bndes 
30 Conectas. 2014. “BNDES: Prestação de Contas no Senado.” March 27. Accessed on April 15, 2016.  
http://site1367329185.hospedagemdesites.ws/pt/acoes/empresas-e-direitos-humanos/noticia/16983-bndes-
prestacao-de-contas-no-senado 
31 Ámbito Juridico. 2014. “BNDES Questiona Decisão Sobre Acesso a Relatórios de Análise de Crédito.” 
January 14. Accessed on April 14, 2016. 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=257920&caixaBusca=N. 64 
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Court ruled in May 2015 that the institution could not rely on bank secrecy to avoid its 
obligations under the Freedom of Information Act.32 This court’s decisions cannot be 
overturned. The BNDES declared that it would comply with the Federal Supreme Court, 
stating that it now had legal grounding to disclose additional loan data (Coutinho 2015). 
A month after the ruling, the BNDES posted more detailed information on its 
international project support.  
Despite the transnational nature of the network, the indirect strategy was deployed 
only at the national level. Given that much of BNDES’ rationale for not disclosing its 
loan portfolio rested on protecting clients’ confidential information, the network could 
have demanded more disclosure from borrowing governments, but did not focus its 
efforts there. Policy recommendations for achieving greater transparency centered on the 
Brazilian Congress and Central Bank, and ignored the role of borrowers.33 Limited 
attempts were made to pursue the issue at the transnational level. Advocacy organizations 
from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru— all members of the network — set up the 
Regional Coalition for Transparency and Participation and created a BNDES 
Transparency Barometer to measure and monitor the bank’s transparency. To increase its 
visibility, it was launched during the Civil Society Policy Forum, held during the World 
Bank’s and International Monetary Fund’s annual meetings.34 
In sum, the achievements of the BNDES transparency campaign resulted from 
leveraging indirect strategies in the Brazilian national context. Direct pressure on the 
bank did not advance the network’s cause much. The ability to turn from a direct strategy 
to an indirect strategy ultimately led to the campaign’s achievements.35 The network 
                                                
32 O Estado de São Paulo. 2015. “O Sigilo do BNDES.” May 28. Accessed April 15, 2016. 
http://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-sigilo-do-bndes,1695603 
33 For a synthesis of the network’s policy recommendations, see: Conectas 2015.  
34 Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad. 2016. “El Barómetro Sobre BNDES Como Herramienta para la 
Gobernabilidad Ambiental en América Latina.” Press Release, April 14. Accessed April 20, 2016. 
http://www.ambienteysociedad.org.co/es/el-barometro-sobre-bndes-como-herramienta-para-la-
gobernabilidad-ambiental-en-america-latina/ 
35 Instituto Humanitas Unisinos. 2012. “BNDES: Movimentos Sociais Querem Transparência. Entrevista 
Especial com Maíra Fainguelernt.” May 24. Accessed June 30, 2016. 
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recognizes that the actions of the legislative and judicial branches were necessary to 
achieve its campaign goals.36  As noted by a NGO member, “while negotiating with the 
NGOs was an option for the BNDES, complying with [the other branches’] decisions was 
not.”37 However, the failure of the direct strategy and the lack of pressure on borrowing 
governments had two consequences. First, any advances were limited to the specific 
requests made by the ultimate principals and did not cover the full extent of the network’s 
goals. Second, the bank could partially resist reforms at the implementation stage. This 
case shows that a campaign is less likely to meet all its goals unless both the direct and 
indirect strategies succeed.  
 
Socioenvironmental Standards Campaign 
The network not only had vast moral and expert authority when it began its 
socioenvironmental campaign, but its power resources were arguably higher than in the 
transparency campaign. Brazilian organizations had extensive technical knowledge on 
socioenvironmental issues (Abers, and Oliveira 2015; Hochstetler, and Keck 2007). One 
of the most important campaigns to green the World Bank had taken place in Brazil in the 
early 1980s for that reason (Keck, and Sikkink 1998; Vianna 2003).  
Activists also leveraged their moral authority in this campaign. They noted the 
trade-offs involved in the developmental model pursued by the BNDES. Large 
infrastructure and natural resource projects were compared to the jobs or popular housing 
that could be built with the same funds (Rede Brasil 2008, 11). The model’s detrimental 
consequences were also underscored with the giant Belo Monte Dam project, which 
presented a highly visible and negative example (Bratman 2014). The Brazilian 
Movement of People Affected by Dams argued that there should be a new category of 
Brazilians, those ‘atingidos’ (affected) by BNDES-backed projects. The concept of 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.ihu.unisinos.br/entrevistas/509756-bndes-que-desenvolvimento-e-esse-entrevista-especial-com-
maira-fainguelernt 
36 Conectas. 2015. “Replica ao Presidente do BNDES.” April 17. Accessed April 15, 2016. 
http://www.conectas.org/pt/acoes/empresas-e-direitos-humanos/noticia/34860-replica-ao-presidente-do-
bndes  
37 Authors’ interview with Borges, Op. cit. 
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atingidos was later taken up by the transnational advocacy network.38  
The network stressed that all communities, in Brazil and beyond, should be 
granted sovereignty over development choices for their locales: “Development cannot be 
imposed” (Rede Brasil 2008, 13). Its members showed concern that projects financed by 
BNDES would use a double quality standard, strategically complying with foreign 
legislation that was weaker than the Brazilian (Plataforma BNDES 2007, 18). Brazilian 
advocacy organizations felt that it was their moral obligation to provide a voice for 
vulnerable communities outside of Brazil. As an NGO representative claimed in an 
interview, “Our office is four blocks away from the BNDES.  If we don’t have much 
opportunity for dialogue with the BNDES, can you imagine what it is like for an 
indigenous population in Bolivia?”39  
The network’s participants correspondingly focused on documenting the ways 
that the projects BNDES funded internationally fell short of their development ideals 
(Verdun 2008). Throughout this period, they organized meetings where local populations 
could share their experience with BNDES investments and denounced “paradigmatic 
cases” of BNDES’s investments in Latin America and Africa (for example, FASE 2013; 
DAR 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Asociación Ambiente y Sociedad, 2015).  
These power resources were first leveraged, as in the transparency campaign, 
through a direct strategy of influence. Between August 2005 and July 2006, members of 
the advocacy network met with BNDES officials from the environmental and electricity 
divisions (Ibase 2014, 4). Yet this initial dialogue proved futile. The bank offered 
contacts primarily in its comparatively powerless social division (Ibase 2014, 5). 
Meanwhile, technical staff in the infrastructure and international divisions either resisted 
the socioenvironmental orientation (Spink 2013, 18) or simply considered it outside their 
expertise.40  
Following this initial period of the network’s direct campaign, the BNDES carried 
                                                
38 Plataforma BNDES. 2009. “Carta dos Atingidos por Projetos Financiados pelo Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social.” November 25. Accessed June 30, 2016. 
http://reporterbrasil.org.br/2009/12/carta-dos-atingidos-pelo-bndes/ 
39 Authors’ interview with Iderley Colombini, Ibase representative, Rio de Janeiro, May 2014. 
40 Authors’ interview with BNDES’ Infrastructure Division bureaucrats, Rio de Janeiro, May 2012. 
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out a few socioenvironmental reforms, but these did not meet activists’ demands. In 
2008, the bank signed the Protocol of Intentions for Socioenvironmental Responsibility 
with the Ministry of Environment, but the reform faced implementation issues (Ibase 
2014, 8).41 That same year, BNDES included a socioenvironmental impact assessment of 
loan requests. However, activists considered that the risk classification was too narrow 
and that it failed to include special protections for indigenous populations (Fórum de 
Diálogo 2014b, 6).  
In November 2009, the network met with bank authorities, including its president, 
in a meeting symbolically titled the “First South American Meeting of Populations 
Affected by BNDES Financed Projects.” Over 200 individuals representing 50 NGOs 
participated, including organizations from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. As in the 
transparency campaign, activists were disappointed with the results of direct negotiations. 
They noted that bank authorities had backtracked from earlier commitments.42 Activists 
concluded that the bank would ignore the network as a valid interlocutor if it sought out 
structural reforms rather than settling for compensatory measures (Glass 2009).  
In 2010, the BNDES presented its Social and Environmental Policy, which 
provided guidelines to evaluate firms’ assessments. The bank launched the policy without 
previous consultation with activists.43 The network continued to pressure its target by 
producing several public documents which expressed their criticism of this policy. They 
argued that the bank did not provide an independent assessment of projected impacts and 
compensations and that affected communities continued to lack a mechanism through 
which to provide their input prior to the loan’s execution. Finally, they criticized the lack 
of information about how the bank monitored a project or which enforcement 
mechanisms were available in case of non-compliance (Fórum de Diálogo 2014b). The 
BNDES Social and Environmental Policy also lacked workable criteria regarding 
                                                
41 Plataforma BNDES. 2009. “Documento de Posicionamento da Plataforma BNDES.” February 13. Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil. 
42 INESC. 2009. “BNDES Ignora Cobranças de Atingidos pelos Projetos Financiados pelo Banco.” Press 
Release. November 27. Accessed June 30, 2016. http://www.inesc.org.br/noticias/noticias-
gerais/2009/novembro/bndes-ignora-cobrancas-de-atingidos-pelos-projetos-financiados-pelo-banco  
43 Authors’ interview with NGO representative, location undisclosed, May 2014. 
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socioenvironmental assessments of projects outside of Brazil.  
The network re-engaged the bank in 2014 in the Dialogue Forum Between 
BNDES and Civil Society in an attempt to improve the bank’s Policy on 
Socioenvironmental Responsibility. It continued to press upon BNDES authorities the 
same set of demands as before, noting that the bank had made little progress in 
socioenvironmental issues (Fórum de Diálogo 2015, 1).  
Why was the socioenvironmental campaign, which had greater power resources 
than the transparency campaign, less influential? And why did the socioenvironmental 
campaign not include both direct and indirect strategies of influence? We posit that the 
socioenvionmental campaign faced the recalcitrance of both the target and its proximate 
and ultimate principals. In addition, the network missed the opportunity to exercise 
greater pressure through borrowing governments.   
The bank’s proximate principal, the executive, strongly resisted including 
socioenvironmental standards in BNDES lending. The presidency of Lula da Silva (2003-
2010) did not want to impose policy conditions on loan recipients and actively promoted 
the development model rejected by the network (Hochstetler 2014). His first Minister of 
Environment, Marina Silva, agreed with many of the network’s demands. Silva left 
activists without an ally within the Executive Power, however, when she resigned in 
protest in May 2008, citing the priority given to large development projects over 
environmental protection (Abers, and Oliveira 2015, 12). Dilma Rousseff’s 
administrations resisted the network’s proposals even more strongly. The new 
government set up “Situation Rooms” where ministerial representatives discussed how to 
remove obstacles – like environmental licensing – to infrastructure projects.44  
The ultimate principal that first allowed the indirect strategy to succeed in the 
transparency campaign, the Brazilian Congress, was unavailable in this campaign as 
leverage on the target. The conservative ruralist group in Congress gained ground in the 
2010 elections, leaping to 35% of all Congressional members and became key to 
Rousseff’s governing coalition. The group used its veto power in Congress to weaken 
existing Brazilian socioenvironmental legislation, by relaxing legislation on demarcation 
                                                
44 Authors’ interview with Celso Knijnik, Director of Energy Programs for the Programa de Aceleração do 
Crescimento (Growth Acceleration Program), Brasilia, September 2014. 
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of indigenous lands, limitations on deforestation, and impact assessment (DIAP 2014).  
Despite the transnational nature of the network, the indirect strategy, as in the 
transparency campaign, was fixed at the national level. In the socioenvironmental 
campaign, the absence of transnational network pressure on borrowing governments is 
particularly striking since local grassroots organizations were active in their resistance to 
BNDES-funded projects. After the BNDES announced in 2011 that it would finance the 
construction of a highway in Bolivia, local populations began a cycle of protests against 
the project. These actions led the government of Evo Morales (2006-present) to cancel 
the loan (Morales 2013). Peruvian NGOs also successfully pressured the Peruvian 
Congress to halt the 2010 Peru-Brazil Energy Cooperation Agreement, centered on 
BNDES-funded hydroelectric dams (Moreira 2015, 250). Local organizations drew 
attention to their cause in the Organization of American States and the United Nations’ 
Rio +20 (Moreira 2015, 215).  
The BNDES network, however, continued to deploy its influence strategies within 
Brazil. In the case of Bolivia, activists requested meetings with BNDES President 
Coutinho and Rousseff’s Chief of Staff, and wrote public letters to the BNDES and the 
Brazilian Foreign Ministry. 45 Yet the Brazilian government declined to put pressure on 
Bolivia to improve socioenvironmental outcomes and BNDES ignored all network 
requests for meetings.46 The network also did not exercise pressure on the Peruvian 
government and was marginal to the transnational campaign led by local NGOs. To the 
dismay of the Peruvians, Brazilian NGOs lacked the personnel and budgets for sustained 
participation in their campaign (Moreira 2015, 214).  
In short, the network was unable to leverage either a direct or indirect strategy of 
influence in its socioenvironmental campaign inside Brazil. As in the transparency 
                                                
45 See: Itamaraty. 2011. “Situação na Bolivia.” Press Release. Accessed on April 22, 2016. 
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/situacao-na-bolivia BNDES. 2014. 
“Posicionamento Encaminhado pela Assessoria de Emprensa do BNDES, Relativo ao Relatório ‘Casos 
Paradigmáticos de Investimento do Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social do Brasil 
(BNDES) na América do Sul’.” Press Release. September 09. Accessed April 22, 2016. http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Resposta%20BNDES_AIDA_PORT.doc  
46 Plataforma BNDES. 2011. “O BNDES é (Co)Responsável pelos Conflitos na Bolívia. Pela Suspensão 
Imediata do Financiamento à Construção da Estrada.” September 29. 
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campaign, the network’s demands faced the BNDES’ recalcitrance. The demands 
conflicted with the bank’s disinclination to impose socioenvironmental conditions on host 
countries. Yet, unlike the transparency campaign, no ultimate principals were interested 
in taking up the network’s demands and increasing pressure on the bank. The network 
further missed the opportunity to deploy influence strategies against borrowing 
governments. Rather than lead to greater momentum for BNDES reform, the cancelation 
of specific projects became isolated episodes. As a result, the bank’s socioenvironmental 
safeguards are far from the network’s demands and the standards applied by the World 
Bank (Cardoso, Borges, and Rodriguez 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Can transnational activist networks influence emerging powers? Can they use the 
same strategies and approaches that were successful when addressing traditional 
economic powers and multilateral institutions? Transnational networking can be a 
powerful form of civil society mobilization because it allows activists to exploit both 
domestic and international opportunity structures and venue shop among them (Cao and 
Ward 2017; Roger, Hale, and Andonova 2017; Sikkink 2005; Silva 2013). Yet, our 
article shows how a national target may limit activists’ ability to take advantage of this 
potential. In making this argument, we join a long tradition in the study of collective 
action that emphasizes how different targets require different strategies on the part of 
activists. 
Our conclusions derive from the study of one kind of national target, the 
globalized national development bank. There may be important differences among 
national targets that future research should explore. First is the degree to which the 
national target is vulnerable to domestic pressure. Our research suggests that the 
governance arrangements of a target conditions the opportunities for activists to find 
openings. While the BNDES network focused on influencing the bank directly, the cards 
were stacked against this approach. The bank had few incentives to depart from its 
principal, the national executive, which also resisted the network’s demands. Other 
national targets may be more prone to principal-agent problems that can be exploited by 
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activists. Vulnerability to domestic pressure is also conditioned by regime type. Brazil’s 
democratic setting facilitated the indirect strategy that leveraged the oversight power of 
the National Congress and Judiciary to improve bank transparency. Among rising-
powers, Brazil, India, and South Africa have comparatively open political settings (Abers 
1999; Rodrigues 2016, 704), while China obviously does not (Gilley 2012; Xie 2009). In 
such closed domestic settings, the importance of outside influence, a point we turn to 
next, will prove even greater. 
The second difference is the degree to which the national target is exposed to 
external pressure. Sikkink and Keck’s (1998) boomerang strategy is particularly apt in 
settings where the national target is vulnerable to outside influence (Wu 2005). Yet, the 
target state’s position in international politics, including its size and relative power, can 
condition its exposure to external pressure (Burgerman 2001, 9). Rising-powers may be 
more impervious to traditional forms of outside influence, such as those that originate in 
an international institution or an established power. But can activists find other forms of 
external pressure?  
One possibility lies in rising economic powers’ concern over their reputations in 
other emerging economies (Bräutigam 2009; Shambaugh 2015; Stuenkel, and Taylor 
2015). An important next step, therefore, involves understanding the conditions that make 
borrowing governments more susceptible to leverage. One answer points to presence of a 
robust civil society that can exercise influence over its home government. Yet, as the case 
of BNDES shows, this may not be enough to bring transnational pressure to bear on 
borrowing governments. The national character of the NDB makes this more difficult, we 
argue, because it reduces the likelihood of equal footing between lending and borrowing 
advocates. The BNDES-focused network did not manage to overcome this challenge and 
missed opportunities to supplement its action with greater mobilization in recipient 
countries. Future research may focus on how foregrounding of activists from the target’s 
home state influences the transnational network’s strategic choices. 
 Our emphasis on the characteristics of targets also raises the issue of the degree to 
which the emerging-power multilateral banks, such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the BRICS’ New Development Bank, will be more like the 
traditional banks or the globalized NDBs (Chin 2016). On the one hand, these new 
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institutions’ supranational mandates will not be accompanied by policy conditionalities. 
This makes their mandates more like those of globalized NDBs. On the other hand, these 
multilateral institutions will be organized around a collective principal, making their 
access points more like those of traditional MDBs. The consequences that this new mix 
of mandate and governance arrangement may have for transnational networks is grounds 
for further examination.  
 Finally, these observations also raise broader implications for international 
relations. Both international financial institutions and non-state actors have been key 
disseminators of liberal international values, however imperfectly (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Kopinski, and Sun 2014; Woods 2008). Not only are emerging powers’ 
governments and banks, in contrast, less willing to impose those values, but our study of 
the BNDES network suggests that NGOs have a narrower set of effective strategies to 
influence them. The rise of South-South finance may therefore shape the global 
normative structure well beyond the direct effects of their loans. These are serious 
potential shortcomings, especially if they instigate a “race to the bottom” in transparency 
and socioenvironmental expectations among global financiers (Kopinski, and Sun 2014; 
Woods 2008).  
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